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L Introduction
A Latin cross stands in the Mojave National Preserve.2 This nondescript,
five-foot white cross represents more than just an Easter gathering place, a
memorial for World War I veterans, and an endorsement of the Christian faith
by the federal government. 3 This cross, in the middle of a California desert, is
representative of a showdown that will undoubtedly occur across the country.
Standing in the desert for over seventy years, this cross brings to the forefront a
battle between those trying to protect pieces of Christian history and war
memorials from destruction and those trying to rid the country of symbols they
find offensive and repulsive even to look at from a distance.4 A circuit split
developed in the fall of 2007 on whether the government can cure an
Establishment Clause violation by transferring the monument and the land to a
private individual or group, usually the group that erected the monument
decades beforehand.5 This is a battle the Veterans of Foreign Wars (VFW)
1. 1 MEMOIRS OF JOHN QUINCY ADAMS: COMPRISING PORTIONS OF HIs DIARY FROM 1795
TO 1848 265 (Charles Francis Adams ed., 1874) (1803) (recording his church attendance at the
Christian service held inside the United States Capitol Building attended regularly by President
Thomas Jefferson).
2. See Buono v. Kempthorne, 502 F.3d 1069, 1071 (9th Cir. 2007), amended and
superseded and reh 'g denied by Buono v. Kempthome, 527 F.3d 758 (9th Cir. 2008) (pointing
out the location of the cross on the top of Sunrise Rock).
3. See id. at 1072 (discussing what the cross represents, what the cross has been used for,
the cross's history, and the dimensions of the cross-a Latin cross has two arms at right angles
to one another).
4. See id. (stating that the Veterans of Foreign Wars placed the Latin cross as a memorial
in 1934); see also Freedom from Religion Found., Inc. v. City of Marshfield, 203 F.3d 487, 489
(7th Cir. 2000) (stating that the person challenging the presence of the statue changed his travel
routes to avoid driving by the statue).
5. See Buono v. Kempthorne, 527 F.3d 758, 759 (9th Cir. 2008) (declaring that the
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most likely never could have imagined when they erected the first cross atop
Sunrise Rock. The importance of the battle, however, cannot be understated. It
will not only determine the destiny of memorials and monuments depicting or
taking the form of religious symbols, but it will also impact the future law of
government reaction to private free speech.
Following the adverse ruling in Buono v. Kempthorne,6 the government
filed a brief for rehearing with the Ninth Circuit, arguing the three-judge panel
committed five main errors: (1) neglecting to recognize that the Establishment
Clause does not require hostility toward religion; (2) failing to acknowledge
that legislative expressions of a secular purpose are entitled to deference;
(3) rejecting the Seventh Circuit's conclusion that a land transfer is a cure;
(4) failing to avoid constitutional infirmity in interpretation where possible to
do so; and (5) refusing to admit that transferring the land to the logical
purchaser is permissible and sensible.7 This Note explores each of these points
in depth through the context of the land transfer situation of the Ten
Commandments cases of 2005 and disputes that the cross in Buono is actually
an Establishment Clause violation. Additionally, this Note examines the public
function aspect addressed by the plaintiffs in these cases and referenced by each
of the courts, and it addresses the speech aspects as well as the federal
government split.
In Part II, this Note begins by summarizing the current state of
Establishment Clause jurisprudence. Providing background in the
Establishment Clause, Part III then discusses the split among the federal
branches of government. The Part first examines the Ninth Circuit case of the
Sunrise Rock cross and how the circuit split developed. Next, the Note moves
into the Seventh Circuit cases allowing transfer of land to cure an
Establishment Clause violation and the rationale behind the holdings. Laying
the foundation for the circuit split, Part IV of the Note explores the Ten
Commandments cases of 2005 and argues that the Latin cross in the Mojave
Preserve is not an Establishment Clause violation. From there, the Note
predicts what path the Court will take if it analyzes the cross as an
Establishment Clause violation. To do this, Part IV investigates similar cases
Ninth Circuit refuses to follow any possible presumption set forth by the Seventh Circuit that "a
sale of real property is an effective way for a public body to end its inappropriate endorsement
of religion in the absence of unusual circumstances").
6. Buono v. Kempthorne, 502 F.3d 1069, 1086 (9th Cir. 2007), amended and
superseded and reh 'g denied by Buono v. Kempthome, 527 F.3d 758 (9th Cir. 2008) (holding
that the district court did not abuse its discretion by enjoining the land transfer and ordering that
the cross be removed).
7. Petition for Rehearing of Defendants-Appellants at i, Buono v. Kempthorne, No. 05-
55852 (9th Cir. Nov. 20, 2007), reh "g denied, 527 F.3d 758 (9th Cir. 2008).
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the Supreme Court has examined over the course of the nation's history dealing
with sham transactions, continuing involvement and reversionary interests, and
addresses possible objections to whether true separation can ever be achieved.
After this discussion, the Note delves into why the Supreme Court, if certiorari
is granted, will ultimately conclude that the Seventh Circuit came to the correct
result--by examining past Establishment Clause jurisprudence, looking at the
nation's history and tradition, and exploring the consequences on speech of
adopting the Ninth Circuit's rationale. However, because of criticisms of the
Seventh Circuit's approach, the Note concludes by recommending that the
Supreme Court adopt a new test, created by using elements of the Seventh
Circuit decision as the first three prongs of the test and adding two additional
prongs adopted from Supreme Court First Amendment jurisprudence.
II. The Establishment Clause
The Establishment Clause of the First Amendment states that "Congress
shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion."0 The Supreme
Court, however, has struggled to interpret the Establishment Clause and has not
settled on a single formula to draw a constitutional line between what is and is
not permissible under the clause. 9 Since 1947, when the Supreme Court
decided that the Clause means there should be an absolute separation between
the church and the state,' 0 the jurisprudence has not been predictable. Current
8. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
9. See, e.g., Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of theUniv. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 861
(1995) (Thomas, J., concurring) ("Establishment Clause jurisprudence is in hopeless disarray.").
10. See Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15 (1947) (using President Jefferson's
language to suggest that the phrase "a wall of separation between Church and State" means more
than just the principle that the United States will not have an official state religion and outlaw
all other religious faiths). The court stated:
The "establishment of religion clause" means at least this: Neither a state nor the
Federal Government can set up a church. Neither can pass laws which aid one
religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion over another. Neither can force nor
influence a person to go to or to remain away from church against his will or force
him to profess a belief or disbelief in any religion. No person can be punished for
entertaining or professing religious beliefs or disbeliefs, for church attendance or
non-attendance. No tax in any amount, large or small, can be levied to support any
religious activities or institutions, whatever they may be called, or whatever from
[sic] they may adopt to teach or practice religion. Neither a state nor the Federal
Government can, openly or secretly, participate in the affairs of any religious
organizations or groups and vice versa. In the words of Jefferson, the clause
against establishment of religion by law was intended to erect "a wall of separation
between Church and State."
1196
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Establishment Clause jurisprudence points in two directions. On the one
hand, the cases look to the powerful impact religion and religious traditions
have had on America throughout its history.' 2 On the other hand, the case law
examines the principle that when government becomes entangled in religion,
religious freedom may become endangered. 13  Despite these somewhat
contradictory objectives in applying Establishment Clause analysis, over the
last fifty years the Court consistently has held that the Constitution does not
require a hostile relationship between religion and the government. 14 The
Clause does not mean that the government should pursue striking down
everything religious in nature.15
In 1971, the Supreme Court devised the three-prong Lemon test to guide
Establishment Clause analyses. 16 The Lemon test states: "First, the statute
must have a secular legislative purpose; second its principal or primary effect
must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion; finally, the statute must
not foster 'an excessive government entanglement with religion."" 7 Over the
past quarter century, however, the Court has backed away from applying the
Lemon test.' 8 The one consistent pattern in Establishment Clause jurisprudence
is that the Supreme Court recognizes that these cases are very fact-intensive and
even the slightest variation alters the analysis. 19 The Ten Commandments cases
11. See Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 683 (2005) (calling the Supreme Court
jurisprudence "Januslike," after Janus, the two-faced Roman god).
12. See id. (discussing writings evidencing that the Founding Fathers believed whole-
heartedly in a God and that the unalienable rights of man came from Him); see also THE
DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776) ("We hold these truths to be self-evident,
that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable
Rights .... ).
13. See Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 683 (providing the other "face" that the Supreme Court
must protect in ruling on such cases).
14. See Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 313-14 (1952) (discussing that the United
States is a nation of religious people, whose institutions presuppose a Supreme Being). While
the court acknowledged the importance of a disentangled Church and State, it refused to read
into the Bill of Rights a philosophy of hostility toward religion. Id. at 315.
15. See Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 845-46 (1995)
(issuing a caution that fostering hostility toward religion could undermine the neutrality
required by the Establishment Clause).
16. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971) (laying out a three-part test to
analyze the Establishment Clause).
17. Id.
18. See Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 686 (2005) (showing that many recent cases
have not applied the Lemon Test).
19. See Buono v. Kempthome, 502 F.3d 1069, 1082 n. 13 (9th Cir. 2007), amended and
superseded and reh'g denied by Buono v. Kempthorne, 527 F.3d 758 (9th Cir. 2008)
(explaining that fact-specific inquiries must take place).
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of 2005, Van Orden v. Perry2° and McCreary County, Kentucky v. American
Civil Liberties Union of Kentucky,21 illustrate this reality as the Court declared
one monument on capitol grounds not to be an Establishment Clause violation
while declaring the posting of the Ten Commandments in a county courthouse
to be an Establishment Clause violation.
22
III. Federal Government Split
The Ninth Circuit decision in Buono not only creates a split between two
circuit courts but also constructs a split among the three federal branches of
government.23 Buono pits the Ninth Circuit against the two elected branches of
the federal government, which both agree with the Seventh Circuit's
approach.24 In 2002, after litigation commenced, Congress declared the
Mojave Preserve cross a national World War I memorial and authorized the
Secretary of the Interior to acquire a replica of the original plaque and cross and
to install the replica on the grounds of the memorial.25 According to the Ninth
Circuit, as a national war memorial, the National Park Service became charged
with the supervision, management, and control of the monument.26 In 2003,
Congress passed another bill that included the land exchange agreement at
27issue.
20. See Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 681 (2005) (holding that the Establishment
Clause allows a monument containing the Ten Commandments on the Texas State Capitol
grounds).
21. See McCreary County, Ky. v. Am. Civil Liberties Union of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 881
(2005) (finding that the display of the Ten Commandments in a courthouse violated the
Establishment Clause).
22. Compare Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 692 (holding that the Texas display of the Eagle's
Ten Commandments monument on the capitol grounds did not violate the Establishment
Clause), with McCreary County, 545 U.S. at 881 (upholding a permanent injunction ordering
the posting of Ten Commandments on courthouse wall to be taken down).
23. See Buono, 502 F.3d at 1085 (describing the government's "herculean efforts" to
leave the Latin cross intact).
24. See id. (explaining that Congress's goal was to maintain the cross); see also Randal C.
Archibold, Bush Signs Law to Save War Memorial Cross, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 15, 2006, at A14
(explaining President Bush's reasoning for signing the law to take city land by eminent domain
in hopes of preserving a Latin cross war memorial in San Diego).
25. See Buono v. Kempthorne, 502 F.3d 1069, 1074 (9th Cir. 2007), amended and
superseded and reh 'g denied by Buono v. Kempthome, 527 F.3d 758 (9th Cir. 2008) (reprinting
the bill Congress passed granting the Secretary of the Interior $10,000 for this purpose).
26. See id. at 1073-74 (discussing the cross's designation as a national memorial); see
also 16 U.S.C. §§ 2, 431 (2000) (creating duties of regulating and promoting national parks,
monuments, and reservations).
27. See Buono, 502 F.3d at 1074; see also 16 U.S.C. § 410aaa-56 (2000 & Supp. 2007)
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Similarly, the Executive Branch began to work as feverishly as the Legislative
Branch to save Latin Cross war memorials.28 In August 2006, President Bush
signed legislation transferring a Latin Cross war memorial from the city of San
Diego to the federal government.29 While the Supreme Court has yet to address the
question of whether a Latin Cross war memorial constitutes an Establishment
Clause violation, the Ninth Circuit, in 1993, declared that the San Diego cross
violated the California Constitution. 30 Both Congress and President Bush believed
that transferring the land from the San Diego local government to the federal
government would stall an order requiring the cross to be taken down as litigation in
federal court commenced.3' In Buono, the Ninth Circuit veered from the policy of
the other two federal branches and held that the cross must be removed.32
A. The Ninth Circuit-Buono v. Kempthome
Sunrise Rock, a rock outcropping in the 1.6 million acre Mojave National
Preserve, is home to a five-foot tall cross.33 The controversy over the war
memorial began in 1999 when an individual made a request to the National Park
Service (NPS) to build a Buddhist shrine, called a stupa, on a rock outcropping in
the preserve near the cross.34 After declining the individual's request, the
NPS examined the history of the cross and decided to take it down, given that
the cross had been deconstructed and replaced several times with a
(allowing Henry Sandoz to convey to the Secretary a five acre parcel of land in the preserve in
exchange for the Sunrise Rock outcropping with the cross).
28. See Archibold, supra note 24, at A14 (calling President Bush's actions in using
eminent domain in this matter "unusual").
29. See id. (stating that Bush signed the legislation in the Oval Office surrounded by cross
supporters).
30. See Ellis v. City of Le Mesa, 990 F.2d 1518, 1528 (9th Cir. 1993) (holding that the
war memorial violates the "No Preference Clause" of the California Constitution and the
designation of the cross as a war memorial does not remedy the violation). However, the court
failed to comment on whether such war memorials violate the First Amendment of the United
States Constitution. Id.
31. See Archibold, supra note 24, at A14 (trying to explain why President Bush would
use the federal eminent domain powers to transfer land from a city government to the federal
government).
32. See Buono v. Kempthorne, 502 F.3d 1069, 1086 (9th Cir. 2007), amended and
superseded and reh'g denied by Buono v. Kempthome, 527 F.3d 758 (9th Cir. 2008)
(upholding the district court's order that the cross be removed).
33. See id. at 1072 (illustrating that the preserve covers 2,500 square miles of
predominately federally owned land).
34. See id. (stating that a request was made by a Buddhist to build a "stupa"-a dome-
shaped Buddhist shrine).
1199
65 WASH. &LEE L. REV. 1193 (2008)
new version and that people gathered there every Easter for religious
purposes.35 This NPS action prompted Congress to pass a law in December
2000 that no government money could be used to take down the cross. 36 In
2001, Frank Buono, a former employee at the Mojave National Preserve,
represented by the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), brought suit to
enjoin the government from displaying the cross.37
A federal district court concluded that the cross was an Establishment
Clause violation and entered a permanent injunction ordering the cross to be
removed.38 In response to this order, while the case was on appeal, in January
2002, Congress passed a statute making the Sunrise Rock cross a national
memorial, officially designating the cross the "White Cross World War I
Memorial. 39 In October 2002, Congress passed yet another bill including a
provision disallowing the use of federal funds "to dismantle national memorials
commemorating United States [sic] participation in World War 1.04o
The government argued that the cross does not constitute a violation of the
Establishment Clause of the First Amendment to the United States Constitution
but rather a war memorial honoring the veterans of World War I.41 The Ninth
Circuit previously rejected that argument and held that the presence of the cross
alone, in the preserve, violated the Establishment Clause.42 Vehicles traveling
on a road 100 yards away can see the cross, and there is currently no sign or
fence to inform travelers that the cross is a war memorial.43 The federal
35. See id. at 1072-73 (discussing NPS's denial of the request to build the Buddhist
shrine).
36. Id. at 1073; see also Pub. L. No. 106-554 § 133, 114 Stat. 2763A-230 (2000)
(showing the first piece of legislation enacted by Congress aimed at saving the cross from being
taken down by the Ninth Circuit).
37. Buono, 502 F.3d at 1073.
38. See id. (describing the first action taken by the courts with respect to the cross).
39. Id. at 1073-74; see also 16 U.S.C. § 431 (2000 & Supp. 2007) (giving the details for
the defense appropriations bill that included the designation).
40. Buono v. Kempthorne, 502 F.3d 1069, 1073 (9th Cir. 2007), amended and
superseded and reh "g denied by Buono v. Kempthorne, 527 F.3d 758 (9th Cir. 2008); see also
Pub. L. No. 107-248 § 8065(b), 116 Stat. 1551 (2002) (providing the bill that disallowed
federal funds to remove the cross).
41. See Buono, 502 F.3d at 1073 (reviewing the defense appropriations bill that made the
Latin cross a national memorial).
42. See id. at 1075 (discussing the Ninth Circuit's previous opinions of the cross being a
violation of the Establishment Clause).
43. See id. at 1072 (discussing the cross's locations and setting, and indicating that those
traveling on a nearby road can see the cross from a distance).
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government owns ninety percent of the preserve with the remaining land owned
by private individuals and the State of California.44
In September 2003, in response to the Ninth Circuit, Congress passed a
final law allowing the transfer of land to a private group in exchange for land
elsewhere in the preserve, thus creating a donut shaped hole in the preserve.45
Nine months later, the Ninth Circuit declared that the Mojave Preserve Latin
cross, regardless of its war memorial status, clearly represents government
endorsement of a particular religion.46 Nonetheless, the government continued
to pursue transferring the land. On September 6, 2007, the Ninth Circuit held
that the transfer of the land violated the previously issued injunction to remove
the cross.47 In 2008, the Ninth Circuit expressly stated that an Establishment
Clause violation cannot be cured presumptively by a transfer of land from the
48government to a private party.
B. Seventh Circuit
1. Freedom from Religion Foundation, Inc. v. City of Marshfield
In contrast to the Ninth Circuit, the Seventh Circuit devised a drastically
different approach to dealing with land transfers in Establishment Clause
cases.49 In 1959, the Knights of Columbus donated a fifteen-foot marble statue
of Jesus Christ, displayed with His arms open in prayer, to the city of
Marshfield. 50 The city allowed the Knights to place the statue on a piece of
44. See id. (describing that private individuals own 86,000 acres of land in the preserve
and that California owns 43,000 acres of land in the preserve, leaving ninety percent of the land
owned by the federal government).
45. See id. at 1086 (describing the parcel of land that the law carved out of the preserve as
a "donut hole"); see also 16 U.S.C. § 410aaa-56 (Supp. 2007) (allowing Henry Sandoz to
convey to the Secretary a five acre parcel of land in the preserve in exchange for the Sunrise
Rock outcropping with the cross).
46. See Buono v. Kempthorne, 502 F.3d 1069, 1075 (9th Cir. 2007), amended and
superseded and reh "g denied by Buono v. Kempthorne, 527 F.3d 758 (9th Cir. 2008) (stating
that, despite the federal government's efforts to keep it on the outcropping, the cross still must
come down).
47. See id. at 1086 (holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion by enjoining
the land transfer and ordering the cross be removed).
48. See Buono v. Kempthorne, 527 F.3d 758, 759 (9th Cir. 2008) (declining to adopt a
presumption of the effectiveness of a land sale to end a constitutional violation).
49. See id. (refusing to read Marshfield as adopting a presumption of the effectiveness of
a land sale to end a constitutional violation).
50. See Freedom from Religion Found., Inc. v. City ofMarshfield, 203 F.3d 487,489 (7th
Cir. 2000) (describing the statue and explaining that the city accepted the gift from the John
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undeveloped public land. 5' The statue stands on a large sphere, which rests on
a base that is inscribed with the phrase, "Christ Guide Us On Our Way. 52 An
individual member of the Knights of Columbus, Henry Praschak, added
improvements to the city land including picnic tables and outdoor grills.5 3 In
response, the city decided to convert the land into a public park, thereby
providing electricity and maintenance to the grounds.5 4 This newly created
public park bordered one of the major roads leading into the city of
Marshfield. 55 In 1998, thirty-nine years after the acceptance of the statue,
Clarence Reinders, a city resident, protested the city's ownership of such an
offensive statue. 56 The fifteen-foot likeness of Jesus Christ offended Reinders
so greatly that he decided he had no choice but to find new routes for traveling
into and out of the city.57 Reinders filed a lawsuit when the city refused to
move the statue out of the park and onto a private piece of land.58
In response, a group of Marshfield residents formed the Henry Praschak
Memorial Fund, Inc. (HPMF) and offered to buy the statue and the surrounding
land from the city.59 The city agreed, and the HPMF bought the land for
$21,560, or $3.30 a square foot, the highest amount of money per square foot
60for which the city had ever sold property. In addition, to further separate the
city involvement from the HPMF, after the sale of the land, the city no longer
maintained the 0.15 acres surrounding the statue and no longer provided
electricity to illuminate the statue of Jesus Christ. 61 Neither the HPMF nor the





55. See id. (illustrating that State Highway 13, also known as Roddis Avenue, is the main
thoroughfare into Marshfield from the south, and the statue is visible to those traveling on the
road).
56. See id. (reviewing Reinders's claim that he avoids visiting the park because of the
statue).
57. See id. (describing the consequences of Reinders's revulsion to the statue and the
inconvenience the statue put on him).
58. See id. (providing the timeline of events). In March 1998, the Freedom from Religion
Foundation asked that the statue be moved out of the park. Id. After the city refused to act, the
suit was filed on April 15, 1998. Id.
59. See id. at 489-90 (pointing out that the private organization consisted of local citizens
who wanted to preserve the statue).
60. See id. at 490 (giving the price paid by the private group for the land and noting that
the bid process on the land met all Wisconsin statutory requirements for the sale of government
owned land).
61. See id. (illustrating the distance that the private organization attempted to place
1202
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city erected anything to acknowledge the boundary line between the private and
public property.62
The Marshfield court held that, "absent unusual circumstances," a sale of
real property makes available an effective channel for the government to free
itself of a religious monument and avoid endorsing a specific religion.63
Specifically, the court gave three types of unusual circumstances as examples.
64
First, a court should not rubber stamp sham transactions that employ a straw
purchaser;65 thus, a court must look to the substance of the transaction as well
as its form to determine whether the government actually disentangled itself
from the improper endorsement.66 Only if a court finds "continuing and
excessive involvement between the government and private citizens" should the
court consider the land transaction invalid.67 Second, a sale must comply with
state laws governing the sale of government land.68 Third, a sale of property
significantly below fair market value would imply that the land is a gift to the
purchasing organization. 69 Applying this analysis to the facts, the Marshfield
court found the city's lack of maintenance as determinative. 70 In addition, the
local government sold the land properly, and the purchaser was not a mere
straw for the government.7' Importantly, the court held that a land transfer is
not a per se remedy of an Establishment Clause violation.72 The private buyer
between the private land and the public park).
62. See id. at 494-95 (enlightening the reader as to the major flaw with the transfer of
land from Marshfield to the Fund).
63. See id. at 491 ("Absent unusual circumstances, a sale of real property is an effective
way for a public body to end its inappropriate endorsement of religion.").
64. See id. at 492 (discussing the typical sort of improprieties that might cause a court to
disregard a land transfer).
65. See id. (recognizing the importance that there was no indication that the city used the
Fund merely as a straw purchaser).
66. See id. ("[W]e look to the substance of the transaction as well as its form to determine
whether government action endorsing religion has actually ceased.").
67. See id. (discussing when a land arrangement does not pass constitutional muster).
68. See id. (finding no impropriety in the city's transfer to the Fund because the sale of
the property complied with the applicable Wisconsin property laws).
69. See id. (comparing when a land transfer is a purchase as opposed to a gift from the
government to the religious group).
70. See id. (explaining the first reason that the land transfer in the case is not a sham
transaction).
71. See id. (discussing what a straw purchaser is and why the Fund is instead a legitimate
purchaser of the land).
72. See id. at 496 (establishing that the holding of the case does not apply to every land
transfer as a presumptive cure of an Establishment Clause violation).
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must differentiate the private land from the other land in the public park.73
Without this distinction, the local government in effect gives a sectarian
message preferential access to a public forum, which is forbidden under
Establishment Clause jurisprudence. 74 The court recommended that a
permanent gated wall or fence with a "clearly visible" disclaimer be built to
remedy the confusion over who specifically owns what land.75 On remand, the
district court approved a plan to build a ten-foot masonry wall around the
private land with a sign in ten-inch block letters reading "Private Park" and
four-inch block letters underneath reading: "This property is not owned or
maintained by the City of Marshfield, nor does the City endorse the religious
expression thereon.
7 6
2. Mercier v. Fraternal Order of Eagles
Five years after Marshfield, the Seventh Circuit again faced a very similar
situation with the same oppositional group--the Freedom From Religion
Foundation, Inc.77 In 1964, the city of La Crosse, Wisconsin approved the
installation of a Fraternal Order of the Eagles Ten Commandments monument
in a one and one-half acre public park.78 In addition to the inscription of the
Ten Commandments, the monument also contains an eagle with an American
flag and an all-seeing eye, as is printed on the one dollar bill.79 While a walker
or jogger on one of the park's sidewalks would notice the monument, none
would see the actual inscription on the monument.8 ° Importantly, the
monument is not located in the center of the park or another location that could
73. See id. (emphasizing the importance that a reasonable observer would not believe that
the city owns the land with the statue).
74. See id. (stating that the private land is still technically a traditional public forum and
no barrier of any kind presents the appearance of government favoritism toward one religious
group to express a message).
75. See id. at 497 (setting forth a standard for building fences and creating signs to ensure
a reasonable observer would know that the land is no longer property of the local government
but instead a private, religious group).
76. See Mercier v. Fraternal Order of Eagles, 395 F.3d 693, 701 (7th Cir. 2005)
(providing the exact wording of the new Marshfield signs approved on remand).
77. See id. at 701 n. 1 (noting that the Freedom From Religion Foundation, Inc., which
brought suit in Mercier, was a plaintiff in Marshfield).
78. Id. at 694-95.
79. Id.
80. See id. at 695 (noting that the writing on the monument is so small, a passerby would
have to come close and make an effort to read the inscription).
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be considered prominent.8 ' In addition, the Eagles maintain and illuminate
the monument at their own expense. 2 Between the approval and dedication
of the monument, the Mississippi River flooded and threatened the city of La
Crosse. 3 Appreciating the efforts of a group of students who fought the
flood, the Eagles dedicated the monument to "those young people who helped
during this spring's flood. "84 No one complained about the monument until
1985, when Phyllis Grams, a resident of La Crosse, joined forces with the
Freedom From Religion Foundation, Inc. and asked the city to remove the
monument.85 The city refused, and the Freedom From Religion Foundation
filed a lawsuit, which the district court dismissed for lack of standing.86 In
2001, the Freedom From Religion Foundation again asked the city to take
down the monument and filed the present suit after the city again vowed not
to remove the monument.8 7 The Freedom From Religion Foundation then
recruited twenty plaintiffs that claimed that they avoided the park because
they became emotionally disturbed and distressed when they saw the
monument.8
In response to the suit brought by the Freedom From Religion Foundation,
in 2002, the city sold the monument and the land it sits on to the Eagles.89 The
Eagles paid $2,640, or $6.00 a square foot, which the city assessor described as
fair market value.90 The Eagles then constructed a four-foot high steel fence
around its land. 91 They also placed permanent signs on each side of the
property reading: "This is the property of La Crosse Eagles Aerie 1254
81. Id.
82. Id. at 696.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. See id. (showing that the Freedom From Religion Foundation first attempted to
remove the monument from the city park two decades after it was originally placed by the
Eagles).
86. See id. (explaining why the first lawsuit, filed sixteen years earlier, failed to produce a
result in the courts).
87. Id.
88. See id. at 697 (describing the dissatisfaction the Freedom from Religion Foundation
expressed over the land transfer).
89. See id. at 696 (reviewing the record showing that after an April 2002 resolution
declaring that the monument did not violate the Constitution and that the city council would do
whatever necessary to keep the monument in its current location, the council decided to sell the
land to the Eagles on June 20, 2002).
90. See id. at 697 (showing that the city council sold the land to the Eagles for an
appropriate amount, avoiding a sham).
91. See id. (pointing out that on its own initiative, the Eagles constructed a fence, as
recommended by the Marshfield court).
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Dedicated to the volunteers who helped save the city of La Crosse during the
1965 flood.'0 2 The city then constructed a wrought-iron fence, four-feet high
and placed metal signs on the fence reading: "PRIVATE PARK. THIS
PROPERTY IS NOT OWNED OR MAINTAINED BY THE CITY OF LA





Applying Marshfield, the Seventh Circuit concluded that no "unusual
circumstances surrounding the sale of the parcel of land so as to indicate
endorsement of religion" existed. 94 Specifically, the monument's location
played a key role in this decision.95 The court noted that the public park
housing the monument is neither in a government building nor near the grounds
of a government building.96 Residents, therefore, do not walk by the monument
while conducting government business such as paying a traffic ticket, meeting
with government officials, or applying for a marriage license. 97 The court also
said the location within the park is important. 98 The monument does not stand
in the center or in another prominent location.99 By selling the land to the
Eagles, the city did not deny access to the park to any citizen or visitor to the
park.' ° The land sale did not affect park use by visitors. 10 1 Additionally, a
municipality only offering the land to one purchaser and not putting the land up
for public sale does not create an unusual circumstance invalidating the land
transaction. 10 2 The court ultimately held that by selling the land to a private
group, in this case the Eagles, "the city exercised an option that served a secular
92. Id.
93. Id. at 698.
94. See id. at 702 (applying the Marshfield three-part test and finding that it was a
legitimate sale of government land).
95. See id. at 703 (determining that location is an important factor for determining the
appropriateness of a sale to cure a constitutional violation).
96. See id. (stating that the difference between selling a piece of a park and selling a piece
of a capitol building is determinative).
97. Id.
98. See id. (describing that a monument that is the centerpiece of the park is different from
a monument that lies in the outskirts of the park).
99. See id. ("It is not ... set at the heart of the Park or in a particularly prominent location
where the sale would eviscerate the design or plan of the Park's layout.").
100. See id. at 703 (discussing that despite the transfer of land, the park is still open to the
public and use is not disrupted).
101. See id. (justifying the sale of land to the "logical purchaser" rather than putting the
monument on the real estate market).
102. See id. (providing that the failure to solicit alternate bids does not invalidate a land
transfer).
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purpose" and did not violate the Establishment Clause. 10 3 With six signs and
two fences, the court concluded that no reasonable person would confuse the
monument with city property.1°4 The court noted that removal is always an
available option but that the holding from Marshfield ensured that it is not the
necessary solution to an Establishment Clause challenge. 0 5 It also explained
that there are situations where a government sale of land would not be
proper.10 6 The court imagined a situation where the government decides on its
own initiative "to sell off patches of government land to various religious
denominations as a means of circumventing the Establishment Clause."'0 7 In
contrast to the imagined scenario, the court in Mercier drew a distinction.08 It
faced a situation of removing a monument that had stood on government
property for almost forty years, and the litigation to remove it prompted the
sale.'09
IV. Discussion
Through a discussion of the Ten Commandments cases of 2005, this Note
finds that the cross in Buono was not an Establishment Clause violation. The
courts, however, in Buono, Marshfield, and Mercier all treated the statue or
monument as a violation of the Establishment Clause. Because the parties in
Buono did not litigate that issue below, the Supreme Court will not address this
question if Buono goes to the Court.
Given that the parties treat the White Cross War Memorial as a violation,
the Court should nonetheless find that the land transfer was valid and that the
cross can continue to stand. The government can use prior Supreme Court
jurisprudence to rebut four main objections to real separation: (1) the
reversionary interest; (2) the "Herculean Efforts;" (3) the history; and (4) the
103. See id. at 705 (finding that a secular purpose is a requirement for a particular
Establishment Clause violation test discussed later in this Note).
104. See id. at 703-04 (stating that a reasonable person could not reasonably think that the
city owns the fenced-in land).
105. See id. at 702 (explaining that the city could have removed the statue but does not
have to in order to remedy an Establishment Clause violation).
106. See id. (reiterating the proposition stated in Marshfield that the sale of land does not
presumptively cure an Establishment Clause violation).
107. See id. (answering the objection that this particular remedy would allow the
government to sell every piece of land to religious groups).
108. See id. at 703 (recounting the importance of the history and tradition of the monument
and what it means to the residents of La Crosse).
109. Id. at 702.
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appearance. The Public Function Doctrine and principles of free speech and
democracy provide the Court with more support for allowing the transfer.
Finally, this Note recommends a new test that courts should use in situations
such as this.
A. The Ten Commandments Comparison
On the grounds of the Texas State Capitol, surrounded by sixteen
monuments and twenty-one historical markers commemorating the people,
ideals, and events that compose Texan identity, stands an Eagles Ten
Commandments monument." 0 The monument sits between the capitol
building and the Texas Supreme Court building."' Thomas Van Orden, a
resident of Austin and former licensed attorney, frequently passed the
monument on his way to the law library in the Supreme Court building."
12
Forty years after the installation of the monument, Van Orden sued to dismantle
the monument.
13
Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for a plurality, decided that using the
Lemon test was not helpful in this situation. 14 Chief Justice Rehnquist focused
the plurality's analysis on the nature of the monument and America's history."15
The Court pointed out the "unbroken history" by all three branches of
government acknowledging the position of religion in American life since the
signing of the Constitution.1 6 The Chief Justice did not dispute the undeniably
religious meaning of the Ten Commandments, but recognized that the
monument carried significant historical meaning as well. 17 Importantly, the
Court recognized that the executive and legislative branches have
acknowledged the historical role of the Ten Commandments.! 8 Chief Justice
110. Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 681 (2005).
111. Id.
112. Id. at 682.
113. Id.
114. See id. at 686 (ignoring, for the time, the fate of the Lemon test, and deciding it is not
useful in dealing with a passive monument).
115. See id. ("[O]ur analysis is driven both by the nature of the monument and by our
Nation's history.").
116. See id. at 686-88 (citing examples such as Congressional resolutions asking George
Washington to issue a religious Thanksgiving Day Proclamation, the text of one of George
Washington's Thanksgiving Day proclamations, and court cases demonstrating the role of God
in America's heritage).
117. See id. at 690 (describing the religious history of the Ten Commandments and the
secular history of Moses as a lawgiver).
118. See id. (providing President Harry S. Truman's papers and Congressional resolutions
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Rehnquist concluded his analysis by stating that simply displaying religious
content or advancing a message consistent with a religious doctrine does not
violate the Establishment Clause, but he noted that there are limits to the
presentation of religious messages." 9
Justice Breyer, the swing vote in the Ten Commandments 5-4 decisions,
concurred in Van Orden, stating that the Establishment Clause does not force
the government to purge all religion from the public sphere. 120 According to
Justice Breyer, to determine the message the text conveys, a court first must
examine how the text is used.1 21 The Texas monument has both a secular and
religious message, but the circumstances surrounding the monument's
placement and setting suggest the state intended the secular message to
predominate. 22 The forty years that the monument sat undisturbed suggest
more strongly than any formulaic test that few individuals are likely to have
understood the monument as amounting to government favor of a particular
religion in a detrimental way.123 In addition, the forty years imply that visitors
to the capitol grounds see the religious message of the monument as part of a
broader moral and historical message that reflects the country's heritage.
124
Justice Breyer stated that removing the Ten Commandments display based
primarily on the religious nature of the text on the tablets would demonstrate a
hostility toward religion that the Establishment Clause does not embrace.
125
Nonetheless, in MeCreary County, Justice Breyer flipped and signed onto
Justice Souter's differing majority opinion. 26 McCreary County involved two
from 1997 as examples).
119. See id. (backing up this conclusion with several Supreme Court cases from the
twentieth century).
120. See id. at 699 (Breyer, J., concurring) ("Such absolutism is not only inconsistent with
our national traditions.... but would also tend to promote the kind of social conflict the
Establishment Clause seeks to avoid.").
121. See id. at 701 (Breyer, J., concurring) (prescribing inquiry into the use of the text and
consideration of the context of the monument).
122. See id. (Breyer, J., concurring) (discussing the Eagles' goal of placing the monument
as a way to shape civic morality and to combat juvenile delinquency).
123. See id. at 702 (Breyer, J., concurring) (weighing history and tradition against a
formulaic test and determining that the history and tradition of the monument is far more
instructive).
124. See id. at 703 (Breyer, J., concurring) (contemplating why the monument existed for
over four decades with no complaints from the public).
125. See id. at 704 (Breyer, J., concurring) (advancing the notion that the religious
appearance of the monument does not matter because destruction of a monument for religious
reasons is hostile toward religion).
126. See id. at 703 (Breyer, J., concurring) (distinguishing McCreary County from Van
Orden).
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Kentucky counties that posted the Ten Commandments on the walls of their
courthouses. 27 Unlike the monument in Texas, the Commandments came
under attack shortly after posting. 28  Justice Souter first held that a
determination of the Kentucky counties' purpose was a sound basis for ruling
on the Establishment Clause complaints. 129 Using Lemon to guide the analysis,
Justice Souter wrote that the original text of the Ten Commandments viewed in
its entirety is an unmistakably religious statement dealing with religious
obligations and with morality subject to religious sanction.' 30 The Court also
pointed out that the postings stood alone on the wall and not as part of a larger
theme.
31
Justice Breyer accounted for his difference of opinion in McCreary
County by noting that the postings in the courthouses had short, yet stormy,
histories. 32 In McCreary, Justice Breyer believed that those who mounted the
Commandments had substantially religious objectives and that the officials
wanted the people viewing the Commandments to take away a religious
message, not a secular message of history and tradition of American culture.'
33
The Court found that the county governments installed the postings for purely
religious reasons, thus creating a distinction from the passive monument in Van
Orden.134 The counties, according to the Court, wanted to "emphasize and
celebrate" the religious message expressed by the Ten Commandments.'
35
Reading Van Orden and McCreary County together, Justice Breyer seems to
127. See McCreary County, Ky. v. Am. Civil Liberties Union of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 850
(2005) (giving case history of county executives posting the Ten Commandments).
128. See Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 703 (2005) (Breyer, J., concurring)
(comparing the short and stormy nature of the Kentucky postings to the long, historical tradition
of the Texas monument).
129. See McCreary County, 545 U.S. at 861 (emphasizing that purpose is an indispensible
part of statutory interpretation that appellate courts use every day).
130. See id. at 869 (concluding that when the government makes an effort to post the Ten
Commandments in public view, surrounded by nothing else, a religious object is instantly
recognizable); see also Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 686 (explaining that sometimes Lemon will not
be applied, including in cases like Van Orden, where a passive monument is involved).
131. See McCreary County, 545 U.S. at 869 (noting the importance of the display's solitary
nature).
132. See Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 703 (Breyer, J., concurring) (discussing the tumultuous
history of the Kentucky postings in McCreary).
133. See id. (Breyer, J., concurring) (bringing up the likely religious objectives of the
executives of the Kentucky counties).
134. See McCreary County, Ky. v. Am. Civil Liberties Union of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 869
(2005) (creating an important distinction between the monument in Van Orden and the postings
in the present case).
135. See id. (discussing what the reasonable observer would conclude from viewing the
display set up by the Kentucky counties).
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suggest the dispositive factors are the monument's history and whether the
monument's objective is purely religious.'36
B. Choosing Van Orden or McCreary County
The parties in the lower courts did not argue the issue of whether Buono is
more like Van Orden or McCreary County, but this issue may prove to be
important in future memorial or VFW cross cases before a court. To answer
that question, a court must look to the history of the cross. 137 The VFW erected
the first cross seventy-four years ago in 1934.138 The veterans stated the
purpose of the cross was to memorialize the soldiers who died in World War
1.139 The original wooden signs stating the monument's purpose no longer
stand, and the cross has been replaced several times, most recently, ten years
ago. 140 The cross is also a gathering spot for Easter religious services, which
have been conducted as early as 1935 and regularly since 1984. 141
Despite the Latin cross being the universally recognized symbol of
Christianity, the Supreme Court should analyze the case under Van Orden
rather than McCreary County. Justice Breyer's concurrence in Van Orden
provides guidance. First, the Latin cross conveys both a religious and a secular
message. 142 Second, the history of this cross monument is not short and stormy,
but rather long and undisturbed.
143
136. See Van Orden v. Perry 545 U.S. 677, 703 (2005) (Breyer, J., concurring) ("This
display has stood apparently uncontested for nearly two generations. That experience helps us
understand that as a practical matter of degree this display is unlikely to prove divisive. And this
matter of degree is, I believe, critical in a borderline case such as this one.").
137. See id. at 701 (Breyer, J., concurring) (stating that when there is a borderline case, the
court must examine the context of the display).
138. Buono v. Kempthorne, 502 F.3d 1069, 1072 (9th Cir. 2007), amended and




142. See Eric Charles Nystrom, From Neglected Space to Protected Place: An
Administrative History of Mojave National Preserve, http://www.nps.gov/archive/
moja/adminhist/adhi6.htm (last visited Jan. 20,2008) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review) ("To local residents, the cross was a religious symbol, and a patriotic tribute to
America's veterans. It also served as a source of local identity, giving residents a focal point
around which to gather and to rally.... [L]ocal residents argued to keep the cross intact.").
143. Cf. Van Orden v. Perry 545 U.S. 677, 701-03 (2005) (Breyer, J., concurring)
(discussing the long history of the Ten Commandments monument and how that contrasts to a
short-lived monument).
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After determining to use Van Orden, the Court must then plunge into the
analysis. The Court faces the challenge of a Latin cross on government
property in a preserve.144 Such crosses are common war grave markers and
memorials, but at the same time, the cross is undoubtedly a religious symbol.
145
The cross, therefore, has religious meaning, but also carries an undeniable
historical meaning. The Buono court twice stated that a cross war memorial
may be seen as remembering veterans of only the Christian religion.' 46 The
VFW surely would dispute this statement by the Ninth Circuit. When those
veterans first placed the cross on the outcropping over seven decades ago, they
did not state and put on the plaque that the monument was in memory of dead
Christian soldiers, but instead, the plaque read "erected in Memory of the Dead
of All Wars.' 47 It is pure speculation for either side in this dispute to surmise
the VFW's state of mind. Like the placement of the Van Orden monument on
the Texas Capitol grounds, the middle of a desert preserve is a passive place
when compared to, say, the classrooms of public schools.
Also important to the Van Orden analysis is that the two elected branches
of government, the executive and legislative, acknowledge the historical role of
the Latin cross. 4 8 A large difference between Van Orden and Buono is that the
cross is not part of a larger grouping of historical and cultural monuments. The
Supreme Court, however, using the analysis from Van Orden, would likely
overlook the cross's vacant surroundings because of the important secular
meaning that the cross conveys and the more than seven decades that the cross
stood undisturbed and unchallenged at the top of the outcropping in the Mojave
Preserve. For these reasons, the Supreme Court should not find an
Establishment Clause violation in Buono or with any similar Latin cross war
memorial. However, because the Establishment Clause issue was never raised
in Buono, and assuming that the Latin cross war memorial violates the
144. See Buono v. Kempthorne, 502 F.3d 1069, 1072 (9th Cir. 2007), amended and
superseded and reh 'g denied by Buono v. Kempthome, 527 F.3d 758 (9th Cir. 2008) (stating
that the cross is located in a 1.6 million acre preserve).
145. See id. (describing the Latin cross as the undisputed preeminent symbol of the
Christian religion and that it cannot be confused with a symbol of another religion).
146. See Buono v. Norton, 364 F. Supp. 2d 1175, 1182 (C.D. Cal. 2005) (viewing the
cross as a memorial for Christian soldiers only).
147. See Buono v. Kempthorne, 502 F.3d 1069, 1072 (9th Cir. 2007), amended and
superseded and reh "g denied by Buono v. Kempthome, 527 F.3d 758 (9th Cir. 2008) (providing
the inscription of the original signs placed by the VFW: "The Cross, Erected in Memory of the
Dead of All Wars").
148. See Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677,690 (2005) (giving examples of the importance
of the Decalogue to the other two Federal branches of government and their outward expression
of its importance to American culture).
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Establishment Clause, if the Supreme Court decides to hear Buono, the Court
will logically take up the question of how the government, finding itself
engaged in an Establishment Clause violation, can cure such a violation. Is
removal necessary, or will transfer to private ownership be sufficient?
Four issues will confront the Court in determining whether the transfer
effectively cured the perceived endorsement. First, does the reversionary clause
in the land transfer prevent a finding of transfer of true ownership? Second, do
the strenuous efforts exerted by Congress to keep the memorial standing create
unusual circumstances? Third, can the White Cross War Memorial escape its
history? Fourth, does the cross shape of the memorial in itself create an
insurmountable problem? While recognizing that segregation is a different
situation, the Court can delve into past segregation cases for guidance in
exploring the process of escaping constitutional violations. Additionally, the
Court should examine the speech implications of both the Seventh and Ninth
Circuit approaches and deal with the significance of the conflict between the
federal branches of government here.
C. Objections to Real Separation
1. The Reversionary Interest
At first glance, the government appears to have an uphill battle in proving
real separation because the government retained a reversionary interest in the
property in the event that the property is no longer used as a war memorial. 1
49
Prior public function jurisprudence cautions against such an action as it may be
interpreted as a sham transaction. 50 Cases mentioned by the Ninth Circuit such
as Hampton v. Jacksonville... and First Unitarian Church of Salt Lake v. Salt
149. See 16 U.S.C. § 410aaa-56 (2000 & Supp. 2007) (noting the reversionary clause).
The clause states:
REVERSIONARY CLAUSE.-The conveyance under subsection (a) shall be
subject to the condition that the recipient maintain the conveyed property as a
memorial commemorating United States participation in World War I and honoring
the American veterans of that war. If the Secretary determines that the conveyed
property is no longer being maintained as a war memorial, the property shall revert
to the ownership of the United States.
Id.
150. See Hampton v. Jacksonville, 304 F.2d 320, 322 (5th Cir. 1962) (raising the
possibility that reversionary clauses provide a way for the city to maintain control over a
property, while giving the impression that the land no longer belongs to the government).
151. See id. at 323 (deciding that a reversionary clause vests complete present control to
the government).
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Lake City Corp. 152 provide that a reversionary clause in the transfer creates state
action.153 In Hampton, the city of Jacksonville sold a municipal golf course to a
private group to maintain segregation policies and placed a reversionary interest
in the deed very similar to the one in Buono.'5 4 Forty years later, in First
Unitarian Church, the Tenth Circuit held that where the government sells a
portion of land to a private religious group and maintains a pedestrian
easement, the First Amendment applies on that easement. 55 These cases,
however, can be distinguished from the land transfer question. The Tenth
Circuit explained this distinction when it revisited the reversionary issue in
2005 with Utah Gospel Mission v. Salt Lake City Corp. 56 There, the city sold
an easement to a private church, but it maintained a right of re-entry if the
private religious group did not maintain the property as a landscaped space. 1
57
The Tenth Circuit distinguished Hampton and other cases from the same era
involving a government reversionary interest, stating that the government in
Hampton remained inextricably intertwined with the ongoing operations of the
private entity and the property served the same primary function as before the
sale. '58
While the primary function of the war memorial in Buono will be the same
as it was under government ownership, the reverter does not give the
152. See First Unitarian Church of Salt Lake v. Salt Lake City Corp., 308 F.3d 1114,1131
(10th Cir. 2002) (concluding that a government easement is a public forum).
153. See id. at 1122 (deciding that the First Amendment free speech clause applies even on
private land when the government holds an easement on the land).
154. See Hampton, 304 F.2d at 320 (discussing the fact that the city was forced to
desegregate its public golf courses).
155. See First Unitarian Church, 308 F.3d at 1122 (providing that the First Amendment
applies on private land because of an easement).
156. Utah Gospel Mission v. Salt Lake City Corp., 425 F.3d 1249, 1257 (10th Cir. 2005)
(deciding that the government, even though it held a reversionary interest, was not inextricably
intertwined with the property). The court stated:
As noted, the property in this case serves a very different primary function than
when under City ownership, and the right of reverter does not require that the Plaza
be used only for a particular purpose, grant the public a right of access, give the
City the right to control expressive activities on the Plaza, or prohibit the LDS
Church from erecting fences or closing the Plaza altogether. The right of reverter
merely acts to preserve the property as a landscaped space, maintain the view
corridor, and allow for public utility easements. To the extent that these subsidiary
functions are encouraged, the City is not inextricably intertwined with the ongoing
operations of the LDS Church or the Plaza.
Id.
157. See id. (explaining the reversionary interest held by the government and the terms by
which the land becomes government property again).
158. See id. (distinguishing the reverter cases of the segregation era).
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government the right to remain inextricably intertwined with the memorial. 59
No statute gives the National Park Service authority to trespass on private land
to maintain the cross once the transfer is complete.160 The Ninth Circuit clearly
misread the statutes. There is no provision in the United States Code that
authorizes the government to enter private land.' 6' Further, there is nothing to
maintain. The cross is made of two pipes, and it sits on a rock.162 There is no
grass to mow, sidewalks to sweep, or facilities to keep clean.' 63 The National
Park Service never "maintained" the cross at all until the government placed a
cardboard box over the cross.164
The reversionary clause gives the land back to the government if the land
ceases to be a national war memorial. 165 The veterans could decide to take the
cross down tomorrow and replace it with a nonsectarian-shaped memorial and
the land would not revert back to the government. As long as any war
memorial is standing and the veterans own the property, the government is not
telling the veterans what ideas they must express on their property. This
transfer allows a long-standing war memorial to remain, but if for some reason
the veterans do not want to leave the memorial standing, the land goes back to
the government at the Secretary of the Interior's discretion.
166
2. The "Herculean Efforts": Purpose versus Motive
The California federal district court in Buono considered the government's
efforts to save the cross "herculean.' 67 These "herculean efforts" included
159. See 16 U.S.C. § 410aaa-56 (2000 & Supp. 2007) (lacking any provision for
government maintenance of the memorial).
160. See id. §§ 1, 2, 431 (2000) (giving the National Park Service authority to maintain
national memorials but never mentioning the right to trespass onto private land to maintain a
memorial that had been sold to a private party).
161. See id. (giving nothing to support what the Ninth Circuit states using 16 U.S.C. §§ 1,
2, 431 (2000)).
162. See Nystrom, supra note 142 (describing the current cross's material as two pieces of
iron pipe welded together).
163. Telephone Interview with Dennis Schramm, Superintendent, Mojave National
Preserve, in Barstow, Cal. (Feb. 27, 2008)
164. Id.
165. See 16 U.S.C. § 410aaa-56 (2000 & Supp. 2007) (providing that if the land is no
longer being used as a national war memorial by the VFW, the land will revert back to the
government).
166. See id. (providing that this all happens at the discretion of the Secretary of the
Interior).
167. See Buono v. Norton, 364 F. Supp. 2d 1175, 1181-82 (C.D. Cal. 2005) (emphasizing
the magnitude of the government's involvement).
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designating the cross a national war memorial, preventing the use of federal
money to dismantle any World War I memorial, authorizing the Secretary of the
Interior to take funds and install a replica plaque of the original, and
transferring the land to the VFW. 168 Whether these acts by Congress and the
President should be considered unusual circumstances making it impossible to
disentangle the government from the property or regular acts taken to comply
with the Constitution, presents a challenging question for the Court.
The Supreme Court can move in one of two directions. The Court could
follow the district court's opinion and decide that such efforts by the
government cannot possibly lead to a clean break from endorsement of a
religion.169 On the other hand, the Court could follow the Seventh Circuit's
approach and decide that the government is honestly trying to disentangle itself
from the situation while preserving the history and tradition of the
monument. 70 Even if Congress's intent in undertaking what the Ninth Circuit
termed "herculean efforts" was religiously motivated, prior Supreme Court case
law points to the conclusion that this fact will not weigh into the Court's
analysis.
171
While an unconstitutional motive of Congress is not a factor to be
considered by the Supreme Court, the Court should consider whether Congress
actually has a legitimate purpose.172 The distinction between motive and
purpose is important and not just semantics. 173 In order for legislative action to
168. See id. (describing what makes the governmental actions "herculean" in nature).
169. See id. (invalidating the land transfer as a violation of the injunction issued by the
courts to remove the cross from the outcropping).
170. See Mercier v. Fraternal Order of Eagles, 395 F.3d 693,705 (7th Cir. 2005) (allowing
the city to transfer the land to the Eagles).
171. See Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 308 (2000) (providing that a
court should give deference to the legislature when it characterizes its actions as having a
secular purpose); see also Nat'l Archives & Records Admin. v. Favish, 541 U.S. 157, 174
(2004) (stating that there is a presumption that government officials will abide by the
Constitution and clear evidence is needed to overcome it); Petition for Rehearing of Defendants-
Appellants at 2, Buono v. Kempthorne, No. 05-55852 (9th Cir. Nov. 20,2007) (showing that
the panel decision is at odds with prior case law).
172. See Bd. of Educ. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 249 (1990) ("Even if some legislators
were motivated by a conviction that religious speech in particular was valuable and worthy of
protection, that alone would not invalidate the Act... what is relevant is the legislativepurpose
of the statute, not the possibly religious motives of the legislators who enacted the law.").
173. As the government argues, Board of Education v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226 (1990) is
especially relevant because it dealt with the Establishment Clause. Petition for Rehearing of
Defendants-Appellants at 10, Buono v. Kempthorne, No. 05-55852 (9th Cir. Nov. 20, 2007). In
Mergens, Justice O'Connor wrote that denying a Christian club permission to meet at a public
high school after school hours violated the Equal Access Act. Bd. of Educ. v. Mergens, 496
U.S. 226,248 (1990); see also 20 U.S.C. § 4071 (2008) (making it unlawful for schools to deny
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survive Establishment Clause scrutiny, it must have a valid secular purpose.'74
In United States v. O'Brien,175 the Court refused to accept the proposition that
illegal motivation leads to a finding of unconstitutional behavior.176 Rather, the
question of purpose involves the specific object of the legislation-what is the
legislation trying to accomplish?' 77 The answer to that question is usually
either stated in the law itself or is apparent from the law's very provisions. 7 1 In
Buono, Congress's stated purpose was to allay an Establishment Clause
violation and to perpetuate a war memorial, both of which aims are secular in
nature. 1
79
The lesson from the case is that motivation does not matter if the
government behaves in a proper manner. Similarly in Buono, the government
transferred the land to get out of an Establishment Clause violation. 8 0 It is
pure conjecture that the motivation of Congress was unconstitutional, but even
if the motivation of Congress was to maintain and preserve a Christian symbol,
what matters is the legislation's effect, not its motivation. The land transfer
was legal, and assuming a fence gets built around the monument, the
government does not force someone to look at the cross any longer as he walks
through the desert preserve.
The Ninth Circuit's problem with the "herculean efforts" was that those
actions, in the court's opinion, reaffirmed its belief that Congress was passing
an open forum to a religious group). The Act provided equal access to secular and religious
speech, therefore the act's purpose was not to endorse or disfavor religion. Mergens, 496 U.S.
at 248. The Mergens Court also cites Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578 (1987), for the
proposition that the court is deferential to a legislatively articulated secular purpose and Mueller
v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388 (1983), as further support that the court is reluctant to ascribe
unconstitutional motives to the states when a secular purpose can be discerned from the face of
the statute. Mergens, 496 U.S. at 248-49.
174. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602,612-13 (1971) (stating that there maybe more
than one purpose for the statute, but there must be a valid secular legislative purpose).
175. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 372 (1968) (holding that the statute
forbidding the burning of draft cards is constitutional).
176. See id. at 382-83 (reviewing well-established jurisprudence that illicit motive on the
part of the legislature does not defeat an otherwise constitutional statute).
177. See id. (focusing analysis of purpose on the specific object of the legislation in
question).
178. See Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 394-95 (1983) ("This reflects, at least in part, our
reluctance to attribute unconstitutional motives to the states, particularly when a plausible
secular purpose for the state's program may be discerned from the face of the statute.").
179. Cf Mercier v. Fraternal Order of Eagles, 395 F.3d 693, 705 (7th Cir. 2005)
(emphasizing the "obvious" secular motive of selling land to avoid a constitutional problem).
180. See Buono v. Norton, 364 F. Supp. 2d 1175, 1182 (C.D. Cal. 2005) (rejecting the
government's position that the land transfer is valid because the government is seeking to escape
a constitutional violation).
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the laws in order to save a religious symbol for religious reasons. This is an
incorrect analysis for two reasons. First, the government tried to disentangle
itself from the situation, and second, the result and the legitimate stated purpose
matter, not the believed motivation. The land transfer resulted in private
ownership of the land with the cross. 182 Without the fence around the cross,
however, there is still arguably an endorsement problem. 83 Nonetheless,
whatever Congress's intentions in passing all of the legislation, a constitutional
result occurred.
In Buono, the stated purpose of Congress for the land transfer was to cure
an Establishment Clause violation, while Congress's motive with the extensive
legislation may have been to keep in place a religious symbol on government
land. As a starting point, courts owe deference to the government's
characterization of its purpose. 184 In addition, the government correctly argues
that the Supreme Court has mandated that reviewing courts should read statutes
to avoid constitutional infirmity.185 The Seventh Circuit explicitly stated that a
reviewing court in this situation is concerned with the purpose for the sale of
the monument rather than its purpose at installation.! 86 The purpose for which
the monument has remained in the preserve for over seventy years is important
in understanding why the government would want to keep it in its current
location. 87 Like the Ten Commandments monument in Mercier, the cross in
Buono has developed substantial local meaning.188 At every stage in the
government's strenuous efforts, the government remembered this point and
181. See id. at 1182 (stating that the only way to view the government's efforts is as trying
to maintain a religious symbol without curing the Establishment Clause violation).
182. See Buono v. Kempthorne, 502 F.3d 1069, 1075 (9th Cir. 2007), amended and
superseded and reh 'g denied by Buono v. Kempthorne, 527 F.3d 758 (9th Cir. 2008) (providing
the text of the land transfer between the private party and the government).
183. See Freedom from Religion Found., Inc. v. City of Marshfield, 203 F.3d 487,497 (7th
Cir. 2000) (setting forth a standard for building fences and creating signs to ensure a reasonable
observer would know that the land is no longer property of the local government, but instead a
private, religious group).
184. See Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 308 (2000) (providing that a
stated secular purpose is entitled to deference).
185. See I.N.S. v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 299-300 (2001) (stating that reviewing courts
should read statutes as favorable toward the Constitution); Petition for Rehearing of
Defendants-Appellants at 2, Buono v. Kempthorne, No. 05-55852 (9th Cir. Nov. 20, 2007)
(arguing that statutes should be read to avoid constitutional infirmity).
186. See Mercier v. Fraternal Order of Eagles, 395 F.3d 693,704 (7th Cir. 2005) (focusing
its attention on the purpose behind the sale).
187. See Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 701(2005) (Breyer, J., concurring) (noting the
importance of the length of time a monument has stood undisturbed).
188. See Nystrom, supra note 142 (giving a history of how the people of the area are not
bothered by the cross and have incorporated the monument into their local heritage).
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made repeated statements that it was preserving a World War I memorial.1 89 In
addition, there was an "undeniably appropriate secular purpose of ensuring the
presence of a war memorial on the site" as recognized by the Ninth Circuit.' 90
Clear evidence must be shown on the part of Buono and the ACLU to
overcome the presumption that government officials will uphold the
Constitution.' 9 ' Here, no such showing has been made.
3. The History: Can the Monument Truly Escape Its Past?
A third objection to real separation is whether the cross can overcome its
past. In McCreary County, Justice Souter observed that "reasonable observers
have reasonable memories" and that observers do not ignore the context of a
monument. 192  Justice Scalia in dissent noted what he believes to be an
inconsistency in the majority opinion--the majority's reliance on the monument
erector's purpose rather than on the display itself.193 The Court ends up with
identical displays being treated differently. 94 Displays erected in silence are
permissible, while the Court treats those erected after discussion and debate as
unconstitutional. 195  The McCreary County majority disregarded Justice
Scalia's criticism and stated that whether the display was motivated by
sectarianism or lacked such intent is an important distinction. 9 6 In Santa Fe
189. See Buono v. Kempthorne, 502 F.3d 1069, 1073-74 (9th Cir. 2007), amended and
superseded and reh'g denied by Buono v. Kempthome, 527 F.3d 758 (9th Cir. 2008)
(describing the government's efforts to memorialize the cross).
190. See Paulson v. City of San Diego, 294 F.3d 1124, 1132 (9th Cir. 2002) (en banc)
(stating that San Diego's efforts to sell a cross war memorial served a secular purpose).
191. See Nat'l Archives & Records Admin. v. Favish, 541 U.S. 157, 174 (2004)
(acknowledging that Congress, like the Court, has sworn to uphold the Constitution and that
presumption will not be overcome without clear evidence to the contrary); see also Edward J.
DeBartolo Corp. v. Fla. Gulf Coast Bldg. & Const. Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568, 575 (1988)
(assuming that Congress does not intend to infringe constitutionally granted and protected
liberties); Petition for Rehearing of Defendants-Appellants at 9-10, Buono v. Kempthorne, No.
05-55852 (9th Cir. Nov. 20, 2007) (arguing that government officials have a duty to uphold the
Constitution).
192. See McCreary County, Ky. v. Am. Civil Liberties Union of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 866
(2005) (observing that the reasonable person has certain memories that he will not disassociate
with a certain place).
193. See id. at 907 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (addressing that the objective observer will see
the illogicality of the court's inconsistency in practice).
194. See id. at 907-08 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (comparing displays across the country
similar to the display in McCreary County that are constitutional because the government's
purpose, unlike that of McCreary County, Kentucky, was not "tainted with any prior history").
195. See id. (Scalia, J., dissenting) (reviewing the "absurdity" of the majority opinion).
196. See id. at 866 n. 14 (responding to Justice Scalia's criticism by saying that he does not
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Independent School District. v. Doe, 197 a school district had student-led prayer
before football games. 98 This practice was challenged in District Court as a
violation of the Establishment Clause. 99 In response, the school district
adopted a plan where the students would vote on whether a prayer would be
said at football games.2° If the students decided to have prayer by majority
vote, the students would then select a member of the student body to give the
invocation at the football game.20' Justice Stevens, writing for the majority,
stated that by viewing the evolution of the former prayers to the new practice of
electing whether or not to pray and taking the history of the prayer into account,
it was evident that the school district wanted to maintain the traditional
invocation.20 2 The Court held the school district's action to be in violation of
the Establishment Clause. 20 3 Finally, in Evans v. Newton,2°4 a public function
case later discussed, the Court concluded that transferring an entire public park
to private trustees would not pass constitutional muster.20 5 A reasonable
observer would associate the park with the city and the image of the two
together is inseparable.20 6
The question becomes, is the history of the cross such that it cannot be
viewed in any other way than as a religious object? Is it so deeply rooted in
Christianity that a reasonable observer could not see the secular purpose? The
answer is no. Both Ten Commandments cases lead to that conclusion. First in
give the reasonable observer enough credit).
197. See Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 317 n.23 (2000) ("[W]e now
hold only that the District's decision to allow the student majority to control whether students of
minority views are subjected to a school-sponsored prayer violates the Establishment Clause.").
198. See id. at 294 (providing history that before 1995, the elected student council chaplain
led prayer before every football game over the public speaker system).
199. Id.
200. See id. at 297 (discussing the alternative plan).
201. See id. (explaining how the two elections operated).
202. See id. at 309 ("The conclusion that the District viewed the October policy... as a
continuation of the previous policies is... illustrated by the fact that the school did not conduct
a new election, pursuant to the current policy, to replace the results of the previous election,
which occurred under the former policy.").
203. See id. at 317 n.23 (declaring that the revised practice is state-sponsored religion).
204. Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296, 301 (1966) ("We only hold that where the tradition
of municipal control had become firmly established, we cannot take judicial notice that the mere
substitution of trustees instantly transferred this park from the public to the private sector.").
205. See id. at 302 ("[W]e cannot but conclude that the public character of this park
requires that it be treated as a public institution subject to the command of the Fourteenth
Amendment.").
206. See id. at 301 (emphasizing the integral role of the park in the community as a public
gathering place and the role the city has in watering, manicuring, patrolling, sweeping, and
maintaining the grounds of the park).
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McCreary County, in describing the majority's opinion, Justice Scalia says that
"[d]isplays erected in silence (and under the direction of good legal advice) are
permissible, while those hung after discussion and debate are deemed
unconstitutional."20 7 The White Cross War Memorial has been standing in the
same location for seventy years.208 The VFW placed it there to be a war
memorial and no one objected for many years.209 During that long time period,
the cross came to develop a secular purpose.210 The VFW was clear in its
purpose in laying the monument: It is a memorial to the dead of all foreign
wars. 21' The McCreary County majority noted that "it will matter to objective
observers whether posting the Commandments follows on the heels of displays
motivated by sectarianism, or whether it lacks a history demonstrating that
purpose. 012 The VFW did not place the cross with some sectarian motivation
to force religion on observers, as the court implied was the case in McCreary
County.213  Looking at Justice Breyer's concurrence in Van Orden only
reaffirms this reading of the Ten Commandments cases.214 Seventy years of
undisturbed history matters,2 5 but history can, as in Santa Fe, sometimes cut
against a finding of real separation and the curing of a constitutional
infirmity.2t 6 A major difference between the scenario in Santa Fe and a land
transfer is the fact that absolutely nothing changed in Santa Fe to the
207. See McCreary County, Ky. v. Am. Civil Liberties Union of Ky., 545 U.S. 844,907-
08 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (encapsulating the majority opinion's reasoning on why
McCreary County and Van Orden are different).
208. See Buono v. Kempthorne, 502 F.3d 1069, 1072 (9th Cir. 2007), amended and
superseded and reh 'g denied by Buono v. Kempthome, 527 F.3d 758 (9th Cir. 2008) (stating
that the original cross was laid in 1934).
209. See id. (citing the original plaque that provided the purpose for the cross being placed
on top of the outcropping).
210. See Nystrom, supra note 142 (discussing how the community viewed the cross as a
secular war memorial in addition to a religious symbol).
211. See Buono, 502 F.3d at 1072 (reviewing the VFW's dedication of the cross from
1934).
212. See McCreary County, 545 U.S. at 866 n.14 (describing why history does make a
difference to the reasonable person).
213. See Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677,701 (2005) (Breyer, J., concurring) (describing
the likely religious objectives of the executives of the Kentucky counties).
214. See id. at 703 (Breyer, J., concurring) (comparing the short and stormy nature of the
Kentucky postings to the long, historical tradition of the Texas monument).
215. Cf id. at 702 (Breyer, J., concurring) (weighing the history and tradition against a
formulaic test and determining that the history and tradition of the monument is far more
instructive).
216. See Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 309 (2000) (holding that the
alternative plan developed by the school district was still an establishment of religion, in part
because the district could not escape its history).
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perspective of the reasonable observer.2 17 A person going to the football games
and unfamiliar with the litigation would have no idea that anything had
changed.218 A land transfer done properly, on the other hand, will mark off the
land well enough that a reasonable observer will have no doubts that there has
in fact been a change and that the government is no longer endorsing
religion.219
4. The Appearance
The District Court for the Central District of California believed that the
appearance of the cross alone was enough to doubt its status as a war
memorial.22° In the court's opinion, a sectarian war memorial was really a
memorial only to the soldiers of the particular faith who relate to the symbol.22'
The government has a strong argument, supported by other judges who also
disagree with the Ninth Circuit, that religious symbols, including Latin crosses,
can serve secular government purposes.222 The veterans who placed the
memorial dedicated it not just to the Christian dead but to all the dead soldiers
of foreign wars.223 The organization that paid for the material and maintained it
for decades decided to use a sectarian symbol.224 Whether it is the erector's
217. See id. (surmising that the new prayer policy was just a continuation of a popular
practice that violated the Constitution).
218. See id. (noting that there is no real difference between the pre-1995 policy and the
alternative policy).
219. See Mercier v. Fraternal Order of Eagles, 395 F.3d 693, 705 (7th Cir. 2005)
(concluding that a land transfer meeting the Seventh Circuit requirements overcomes any doubts
a reasonable observer may have as to who owns the land).
220. See Buono v. Norton, 364 F. Supp. 2d 1175, 1182 (C.D. Cal. 2005) (discussing the
inherently religious message of a sectarian war memorial).
221. See id. (explaining that the appearance cannot be overcome).
222. See Separation of Church & State Comm. v. City of Eugene, 93 F.3d 617, 626 (9th
Cir. 1996) (O'Scannlain, J., concurring) (arguing that a cross war memorial serves a secular
purpose); see also Briggs v. Mississippi, 331 F.3d 499, 505-06 (5th Cir. 2003) (finding that
including a cross on a state flag serves the purpose element of the Lemon test); Friedman v. Bd.
of County Comm'rs, 781 F.2d 777, 789 n.2 (10th Cir. 1985) (allowing a cross to remain in a
city's seal); Am. Atheists v. Duncan, 528 F. Supp. 2d 1245, 1253 (D. Utah 2007) (finding that
roadside crosses to mark the death of state troopers are secular); Petition for Rehearing of
Defendants-Appellants at 8, Buono v. Kempthome, No. 05-55852 (9th Cir. Nov. 20, 2007)
(providing examples of cross war memorials with a secular government purpose).
223. Buono v. Kempthorne, 502 F.3d 1069, 1072, (9th Cir. 2007) amended and
superseded and reh 'g denied by Buono v. Kempthorne, 527 F.3d 758 (9th Cir. 2008).
224. See id. (observing that the most recent cross was constructed by Henry Sandoz, the
man who participated in the land transfer).
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purpose or the display itself that matters is a policy question that the Supreme
Court may or may not choose to address, but in McCreary County, the Court
225said that the purpose of erection rather than the display itself is what matters.
D. Insights from the Public Function Doctrine
While different from Buono in many respects, the public function cases
highlight an issue and provide a glimpse of how the Supreme Court handled
this issue with a similar progression: (1) government violates the Constitution;
(2) government seeks to get out from under constitutional violation;
(3) government transfers public land to private parties to escape violation. In
the mid-twentieth century, the Supreme Court heard a series of state action
cases dealing with private groups performing municipal activities and running
elections. 226  The basic holdings of these cases were that when private
individuals or groups are endowed by the state with government-like powers,
these individuals become instrumentalities of the state and are subject to the
state's constitutional limitations.227 The Supreme Court case most similar to
Buono is Evans v. Newton.228 In that case, the mayor and city council of
Macon, Georgia were devised a piece of land to create a park for white
225. See McCreary County, Ky. v. Am. Civil Liberties Union of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 866
(2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (comparing similar displays across the country that are
constitutional because the government's purpose, unlike that of McCreary County, was not
"tainted with any prior history").
226. See Evans v. Newton 382 U.S. 296, 299 (1966) (stating that when private groups or
individuals get government-like powers, they become liable for Fourteenth Amendment
violations as a state actor).
227. In order to exclude black Americans from participating in elections, the Texas
Democrat Party held a pre-primary under the label of the Jaybird Party. Terry v. Adams, 345
U.S. 461,462-63 (1953). In Terry v. Adams, the Jaybirds claimed that they were exempt from
the provisions of the Fifteenth Amendment because they were a private, self-governing,
voluntary club. Id. at 463. The Jaybird primary became the only effective part of the elective
process, thereby excluding blacks from participating in meaningful elections. Id. at 469. The
Supreme Court held that primary elections could not be taken private. Id. In 1981, the Supreme
Court in Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830 (1982), decided a public function case dealing
with hiring decisions made by a private school receiving public funds. Id. at 832. A school
director fired a teacher who spoke out against a policy decision. Id. at 834. Each year, the
government provided at least ninety percent of the school's funds. Id. at 832. Chief Justice
Burger, writing for the court, held that the funds contributed by the state for students to attend
the private school did not mean that hiring decisions constituted state action. Id. at 843. The
relationship between the school and its teachers is not changed because the State pays tuition for
the majority of the school's students. Id. at 841.
228. See Evans, 382 U.S. at 301 (explaining that the city of Macon attempted to transfer a
well-established city park into private hands).
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residents in 1911.229 Recognizing violations of the Constitution, the city
opened the park to all people.23° In response, some people attempted to remove
the city as trustee and appoint new, private trustees, creating a private park for
whites only.23' The Supreme Court held that where the tradition of municipal
control had become firmly established, the mere substitution of trustees did not
transfer the park from the public to the private.232 The Court analogized the
park's role in the community to a fire department or police department.233 The
park was municipal in nature, open to every white person without a selective
element.234
The public function cases provide the current Supreme Court Justices with
a frame of reference to examine the land transfer question. While not directly
on point with the Establishment Clause controversy at hand, the current Court
can draw a parallel between the public function cases, where a traditional
government function was placed into private parties' hands, and the land
transfer question, where the government is exchanging or selling government
property to private parties.
In Buono, the Ninth Circuit correctly noted that the public function cases
do not establish that a transfer of land from the government to a private
individual presumptively cures a constitutional violation.235 The Ninth Circuit,
however, overlooked two aspects when commenting on the public function
cases. First, just because the transfer is not a presumptive cure, does not mean
that transfers, such as the one in Buono, are invalid and not curative of the
constitutional violation facing the municipality. Second, the public function
cases can be distinguished in three ways from the land transfer question.
To find whether the sale of land from the state to the private party
terminated state involvement without creating a sham, a court must look to a
number of factors and come to a conclusion based on the totality of the facts in
229. Id. at 297.
230. Id.
231. See id. (showcasing the strong feelings of those advocating for a continued segregated
park environment).
232. See id. at 301 (noting that the park is an integral part of the city and the momentum it
gained from this status cannot be undone by a transfer).
233. See id. (concluding that the nature of the park itself makes a difference in the analysis
of the case).
234. See id. at 301 (showing that the only admission requirement into the park was race,
therefore, it was nonselective).
235. See Buono v. Kempthorne, 502 F.3d 1069, 1082 n. 13 (9th Cir. 2007), amended and
superseded and reh'g denied by Buono v. Kempthome, 527 F.3d 758 (9th Cir. 2008)
(reviewing the public function cases to state that a transfer does not presumptively fix an
Establishment Clause violation).
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the record.236 The Seventh Circuit examined three specific factors when it
conducted its review of the record in Marshfield.237 First, a court needs to look
at the fair market value of the land in question.238 A court must analyze the sale
of land worth $3,000 at a price of $1 to a private group differently from the sale
of such land at a fair $3,000 price.239 In the first case, the sale is not a true
purchase, but a gift from the government. While in the second case, a valid
sale of land occurs.24° Second, a court must look to the maintenance and
upkeep of the property after the exchange has taken place.24' When a local
government continues to provide utilities and maintenance to the transferred
land, it creates the outward appearance that the government is still actually in
control of the land and endorsing the religion expressed on the private land.242
Third, the court must look to factors to determine whether the transaction is a
sham where the city, seeking to rid itself of an Establishment Clause violation,
transfers the land but really continues to own it or carry responsibility for
maintaining it behind the scene.243
Three factors distinguish the land exchange question from the public
function cases: (1) the government remained intimately involved in exclusive
government functions in the public function cases;244 (2) the government in the
public function cases engaged in elaborate shams to avoid complying with the
Constitution;245 and (3) the public function cases only remain relevant to the
236. See Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296,300 (1966) (discussing the need to sift facts and
weigh circumstances).
237. See Freedom from Religion Found., Inc. v. City ofMarshfield, 203 F.3d 487,492 (7th
Cir. 2000) (presenting three "typical improprieties" for consideration).
238. See id. (discussing the importance that the private group paid a fair market price for
the land).
239. See id. (relating that $1 would be considered a gift if the land is worth $3,000).
240. See id. (stating that a sub-market rate sale price is a gift from the government to a
religious organization).
241. See id. (advancing the idea that maintaining the property after transfer signifies
intention of continuing ownership).
242. See id. (comparing Evans v. Newton, where the city still provided utilities and services
to the private park, with Marshfield, where the city ceased providing electrical service to the
property and stopped maintaining the area).
243. See id. (noting that Reinders and Freedom from Religion based their entire argument
on the restrictive covenant, which limited the use of the land to public park purposes, but did
not void the land transfer).
244. See Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830,842 n.7 (1982) (distinguishing Evans as a
case where the government really provided all of the public services and disguised itself in the
acts of private individuals).
245. See Freedom from Religion Found., Inc. v. City of Marshfield, 203 F.3d 487,492 (7th
Cir. 2000) (contrasting the facts of the case with Evans, where the government set up a straw
purchaser and continued to act as if nothing had changed).
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land transfer question if there is continuing and excessive involvement in the
new private land by the government.246 In the public function cases, when
ownership transferred, nothing in the nature or character of the park or elections
changed-the government participated in every aspect of decision-making and
control.
The land transfer in Buono can be distinguished from Evans in that it is
not a sham transaction because the whole preserve was not transferred to a
private group.247 A valid land exchange occurred, giving the VFW, the group
that originally placed the cross atop the rock outcropping, ownership of the
Latin cross. 248 The Ninth Circuit stated that the NPS remains responsible for
the cross because the NPS "is responsible for the supervision, management, and
control" of national memorials.2 49 Assuming for the moment that the Ninth
Circuit is correct on this point, this control exercised by the NPS is different
from the control in Evans, where the city continued to maintain the entire
segregated "private" park, and from the control in Terry v. Adams, 50 where the
state rubber-stamped the election results of a party that excluded blacks.
According to the Ninth Circuit, the NPS maintains national memorials, whether
publicly or privately owned.25' From this assumption, the federal government
still plays a role with the now private land after the transfer. If this is in fact
true, given the typical and routine nature of this governmental involvement, the
Supreme Court probably would not give much weight to the continuing
maintenance of the memorial by the NPS. There are two reasons why this does
not present a problem for the government. First, the cross requires little to no
maintenance. Even when the government owned the property the cross sits on,
it did not maintain it.252 Second, the Ninth Circuit misread the statutes. The
government not only lacks a mandate but also lacks a right to enter onto the
246. See id. (stating that public function remains a relevant topic if there is continuing and
excessive involvement between the government and private individuals).
247. See Buono v. Kempthorne, 502 F.3d 1069, 1074 (9th Cir. 2007), amended and
superseded and reh 'g denied by Buono v. Kempthome, 527 F.3d 758 (9th Cir. 2008) (noting
that the exchange was one acre with the cross for five acres of land located elsewhere within the
Preserve).
248. See id. at 1075 (listing the consideration received by the government from the
Veterans in exchange for the land with the cross).
249. See id. at 1082-83 (objecting to private control because the National Park Service is
statutorily charged with this duty).
250. Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461, 470 (1953) (holding that the Jaybird-Democratic
election machinery denied minorities the right to vote).
251. See Buono, 502 F.3d at 1074 (providing that the "supervision, management, and
control" of national memorials rests with the National Park Service (citing 16 U.S.C. §§ 2,431
(2000))).
252. Supra notes 163-64 and accompanying text.
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now-private property.253 Further, the Supreme Court has noted that Evans is
limited to the unique facts of the case.254
E. Suppressing Private Speech
Prior Supreme Court jurisprudence is not the only factor that will
influence the Court's decision. The central question before the Court is a
question of remedies, but the case also has significant implications for the First
Amendment Free Speech Clause.255 In order for the Court to analyze the
speech implications, it must first decide not only whether the speech that the
government seeks to regulate is public or private, but also whether the forum
where the speech is occurring is public or private.
256
The Mojave Preserve is a federal preserve. 7 If the Court chooses to
analyze the preserve like a park, it will acknowledge that the Mojave Preserve
is a traditional government forum.258 The Supreme Court has refused to answer
whether private property can be a public forum,25 9 but the Seventh Circuit
looked to three factors to answer this question. A court first looks to the
260historical association of the property with a public forum. Second, a court
sees if the property has been dedicated to public use. 261 Third, a court
examines the physical location of the private property in relation to the rest of
the park.262 In Buono, up until the transfer occurred, the VFW property was
253. See 16 U.S.C. §§ 1,2,431 (2000) (providing no manner in which to go onto a private
party's land to maintain the monuments).
254. See Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 159 n.8 (1978) (limiting Evans to the
unique facts involved).
255. See Freedom from Religion Found., Inc. v. City of Marshfield, 203 F.3d 487, 491 (7th
Cir. 2000) (describing the dramatic difference between government speech endorsing religion
and private speech endorsing religion).
256. See id. at 494 (stating that unless the sale of a section of the public land to a private
group changes the nature of the land, the court applies traditional public forum analysis to the
property).
257. Buono v. Kempthorne, 502 F.3d 1069, 1072 (9th Cir. 2007), amended and
superseded and reh 'g denied by Buono v. Kempthorne, 527 F.3d 758 (9th Cir. 2008).
258. See Marshfield, 203 F.3d at 494 (stating that a park is a traditional public forum).
259. See Denver Area Educ. Telecomm. Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727, 742
(1996) (declining to address the question of to what extent private property may be denoted as a
public forum).
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part of the national preserve.263 The VFW's property is indistinguishable from
the rest of the preserve. 264 The VFW did not create any boundaries to inform
the reasonable observer that the VFW property is not owned by the
government.265 Unlike the Marshfield case, Buono's reversionary clause does
not contain a restrictive covenant that the private property must be used for
public use.266
The result is private religious speech at a traditional public forum.267
Under Capitol Square Review & Advisory Board v. Pinette,268 the Supreme
Court provided analysis for when the government may inadvertently endorse
religion when private religious expression occurs in a traditional public
forum.269 Under Capitol Square, the Court found a violation of the
Establishment Clause either when the speaker is not a purely private person or
the forum is not open equally.270 Examining the facts and circumstances of
Buono under the endorsement test, a court must ask whether a reasonable
person would perceive the existence of the memorial to promote or disfavor
religion or a particular religious belief.27' A reasonable observer would see that
no barrier exists and believe that the federal government is endorsing one
religion over others because the cross stands by itself and not in a grouping.272
Had the transfer occurred and signs and a barrier been put up to distinguish the
263. See Buono v. Kempthorne, 502 F.3d 1069, 1072 (9th Cir. 2007), amended and
superseded and reh'g denied by Buono v. Kempthome, 527 F.3d 758 (9th Cir. 2008)
(discussing the history of the cross).
264. See id. (explaining the position of the cross in the preserve).
265. See id. at 1086 (noting that a reasonable observer would perceive government
endorsement of religion).
266. See id. at 1075 (citing the reversionary clause).
267. See Freedom from Religion Found., Inc. v. City ofMarshfield, 203 F.3d 487,495 (7th
Cir. 2000) (acknowledging that the analysis is convoluted, but nonetheless, the situation
involves a case of private religious speech at a traditional public forum).
268. Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753,770 (1995) (holding
that "[rieligious expression cannot violate the Establishment Clause where it (1) is purely
private and (2) occurs in a traditional or designated public forum, publicly announced and open
to all on equal terms").
269. See id. at 760 (discussing the facts of the case where a private group expressed a
religious message on government property).
270. See id. (stating when and where religious speech cannot violate the Establishment
Clause).
271. See id. at 778 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (stating that the endorsement test is
appropriate for reaching a result).
272. Cf Marshfield, 203 F.3d at 497 (noting the problem of being unable to distinguish
private property from the rest of the government land).
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memorial from the rest of the traditional public forum, that would have ended
the Establishment Clause problems.273
In a Buono-type situation, the government must cure the perception that it
has endorsed the speech of the private property.274 This leaves the courts with
two options: First, estop the private land owner from exercising freedom of
speech and free exercise on its own property, or second, find a way to
differentiate the public property from the private property. 275  The latter
approach is the better approach.276 Once the private group constructs a fence
with signs surrounding it, a reasonable observer should no longer have doubts
over who owns the property.277 Assuming that a fence is built around the Latin
cross like the fences constructed in Marshfield and Mercier, there is no
elaborate ruse on the part of the government to have any person believe that the
federal government endorses the religion represented by the cross on the
outcropping or that the government owns that land. With the fence and the
signs posted on the fence, it could not be made any clearer to a reasonable
person that the government does not own the land.278 As the cross currently
stands, however, without a fence differentiating it from the rest of the preserve,
a reasonable person would most likely think that the cross is owned by the
federal government and that the government is endorsing a particular religion.
F. Elected Branches of Government
The other factor outside of judicial precedent for the court to take into
consideration is the split among the federal branches of government. If the
Supreme Court decides to affirm the Ninth Circuit decision and say that land
transfers do not cure Establishment Clause violations, it will create a split
273. See id. (advocating that the perceived endorsement of religion can be cured without
removing the cross).
274. See id. (reviewing that, because the government may not find private religious speech
inappropriate solely on its content, the only redressable harm that the government has to fix is
the perception that it has endorsed speech).
275. See id. (giving the government two choices in remedying the problem of perceived
endorsement and suggesting that one is better than the other).
276. Id.
277. See id. (doubting that a reasonable person would confuse speech endorsed by the City
with speech made on well-demarcated private property).
278. See Mercier v. Fraternal Order of Eagles, 395 F.3d 693, 705 (7th Cir. 2005)
(providing that after noting the government's extensive efforts, Marshfield precedent, and all the
steps taken to do the land transfer properly, no reasonable observer could doubt the
government's noninvolvement).
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between the elected branches of government and the appointed branch of
government.279
The Supreme Court has made clear on more than one occasion that it is
the province of the judiciary to interpret the law and no other branch can
propose an alternative explanation.280  The courts do need to protect the
integrity of the Constitution, but on a policy issue as widely controversial as
this matter, to go against the two branches of government directly elected by
and representing the people is not ideal. Reasonable minds could differ on this
issue.28 1 The Ninth Circuit took a hard line approach, going against the will of
the people.282 The Seventh Circuit, on the other hand, created a compromise
that preserves the history of the monuments without sacrificing constitutional
principles.28 3 The Seventh Circuit acknowledged that what it was doing, by
forcing barriers to be erected, did not please everyone and did not likely please
anyone, but it was "constitutionally appropriate.",284 The Mercier court allowed
a long standing monument to remain and stated that if the local citizenry at
some point in the future wanted to remove the statue to make room for another
purpose, they should turn to the political process rather than the legal
process.285
G. The New Test
While the Seventh Circuit "unusual circumstances" approach for testing
the validity of land transfers functions well, it leaves some unanswered
questions. The Supreme Court should adopt the three examples of unusual
circumstances devised by the Seventh Circuit as the first three prongs of the
279. See Buono v. Kempthorne, 502 F.3d 1069, 1082 (9th Cir. 2007), amended and
superseded and reh'g denied by Buono v. Kempthome, 527 F.3d 758 (9th Cir. 2008)
(discussing congressional action aimed at transferring the land).
280. See United States v. Peters, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 115, 136 (1809) (stating that if the state
legislatures annul the judgments of the federal courts, the Constitution becomes a solemn
mockery).
281. See, e.g., Buono v. Kempthorne, 527 F.3d 758, 759 (9th Cir. 2008) (declining to read
the Seventh Circuit's opinion as adopting a presumptive cure).
282. See Buono, 502 F.3d at 1082, amended and superseded and reh g denied by Buono v.
Kempthorne, 527 F.3d 758 (9th Cir. 2008) (showing that Congress, the elected branch of
government, differs from the Ninth Circuit on the appropriate remedy).
283. See Mercier, 395 F.3d at 705 (discussing how the sale achieved the practical goal of
extricating the city from the endorsement while preserving the monument in its present
location).
284. See id. (reiterating that neither side is completely happy with the result).
285. Id.
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test, but add two additional prongs from its own precedent in Establishment
Clause cases. The first of the new prongs responds to the need for
distinguishing the legitimate legislative purposes from unconstitutional
motivations, which the Court has continually pointed to as a crucial
286distinction. The second new prong aims to protect the free speech interest of
a private party land owner. At the same time, the free speech interest must be
balanced against the perception of government endorsement of religion. The
new, combined test consists of the following five elements: (1) a court must
look to the substance of the transaction as well as its form to find out if the
government "has actually disentangled itself' from the improper endorsement,
because a court will not rubber stamp sham transactions using a straw
purchaser;287 (2) a transfer must comply with state laws governing the transfer
of government land;288 (3) a transfer of property must not be significantly below
fair market value as the sale would imply that the land is a gift to the
purchasing organization;289 (4) a reviewing court may not question the motives
of the legislative body that approves the transaction, but may review the stated
purpose to determine constitutionality; and (5) a court should consider the First
Amendment speech rights of the party being suppressed and the perception of
government endorsing this speech.
H. The New Test in Application
The new test devised in the previous section takes principles from the
Seventh Circuit and Supreme Court cases discussed earlier in this Note and
combines them into a single test that helps to answer some questions the
previous approach left unanswered. Taking the new test and applying it to the
facts of Buono provides an answer. The discussion section advanced the
argument that the government disentangled itself from improper
endorsement. 290 Additionally, the sale complied with laws regarding the
286. See Bd. of Educ. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 249 (1990) ("[W]hat is relevant is the
legislative purpose of the statute, not the possibly religious motives of the legislators who
enacted the law.").
287. See Freedom from Religion Found., Inc. v. City of Marshfield, 203 F.3d 487,492 (7th
Cir. 2000) (discussing that only if a court finds "continuing and excessive involvement between
the government and private citizens" should the court consider the land transaction invalid).
288. See id. (finding that these private groups must comply with state property laws to
avoid a sham transaction).
289. See id. (comparing when a land transfer is a purchase as opposed to a gift from the
government to the religious group).
290. See supra Part IV (discussing the government's efforts to transfer the land around the
cross); see also 16 U.S.C. § 410aaa-56 (2000 & Supp. 2007) (including nothing to allow the
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transfer of land and was transferred in a fair exchange.291 The government had
a secular legislative purpose in transferring the land.292 Lastly, however, while
the VFW's free speech rights should not be estopped, there is currently no
distinctive separation between the government land and the VFW's land.293
Therefore, the White Cross Memorial fails the test. This could quickly be
remedied, just as the statue of Jesus was remedied in Marshfield.294
To experiment with the new test, imagine some slight twists on the facts of
Buono. First, assume that a local religious organization placed a similar cross
in a park, with the blessing of the city council, in order for residents to observe
the cross and be reminded of the sacrifice their God made for them. In this
hypothetical, even satisfying the first three prongs and the last prong, there
would still be a problem because the legislative purpose lacked a secular
purpose. Thus, according to current Establishment Clause jurisprudence, the
cross should not have been erected in the first place. The legislators explicitly
made known the religious purpose of the cross. If the local government seeks a
land transfer to this religious group, it is not seeking to transfer an object with a
dual secular and religious meaning. The object also has not become a symbol
of the community that could carry any message other than its religious meaning.
Now, assume that a town with a high Jewish population decides to honor
all the dead of the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. The only veterans group in
the town has a Jewish affiliation. They ask the veterans group if they would
like to install a memorial to honor the dead of those wars. The group, without
running the design by the city, places a Star of David war memorial in the local
park. The group makes clear in its dedication and on a plaque that the
memorial is to honor all of the dead soldiers who fought in Iraq and
Afghanistan. Over the next few years, the memorial takes on great significance
to the town as Jewish and non-Jewish soldiers from the community have died in
government to come onto the Veteran's property once the land is transferred).
291. See 16 U.S.C. § 410aaa-56 (2000 & Supp. 2007) (allowing Henry Sandoz to convey
to the Secretary a five acre parcel of land in the preserve in exchange for the Sunrise Rock
outcropping with the cross).
292. See Paulson v. City of San Diego, 294 F.3d 1124, 1132 (9th Cir. 2002) (en banc)
(stating that San Diego's efforts to sell a forty-five-foot-high cross war memorial served a
secular purpose); see also Nat'l Archives & Records Admin. v. Favish, 541 U.S. 157, 174
(2004) (acknowledging that Congress, like the Court, has sworn to uphold the Constitution and
that presumption will not be overcome without clear evidence to the contrary).
293. See Buono v. Kempthorne, 502 F.3d 1069, 1072 (9th Cir. 2007), amended and
superseded and reh 'g denied by Buono v. Kempthome, 527 F.3d 758 (9th Cir. 2008) (noting
that there is no sign to tell observers that the land is not owned by the government).
294. See Mercier v. Fraternal Order of Eagles, 395 F.3d 693, 701 (7th Cir. 2005)
(explaining the proposed remedy ordered by the court on remand, including a wall and signs to
surround the monument).
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the war. A few years later, a Christian businessman and an agnostic teacher
team up to remove the memorial as a violation of the Establishment Clause.
Given the relatively short history of the monument, the town may have a hard
time claiming it is not a violation of the Establishment Clause. Assume that the
monument is declared to be an Establishment Clause violation and that, after
such declaration, the city seeks to transfer the memorial to the local veterans
group and the group places a fence and signs around the memorial. Unlike the
first hypothetical, the government never announced a purpose for a religious
monument. The monument has taken up a dual religious and secular meaning
for the community. The government sought the transfer to escape a violation of
the Constitution and maintain a symbol of the community. At no point did any
legislator state that the monument had anything but a secular purpose.
V. Conclusion
Imagine living in an America where all signs of Christianity are not only
ripped out of the public square, but also forbidden on private property. It is a
scenario the Founding Fathers who wrote and approved the Establishment
Clause, yet attended church services in the United States Capitol and the
Treasury Building, could have never imagined.29 5 The Supreme Court, when
taking on this land transfer question, should adopt a modified version of the
Seventh Circuit's approach in Marshfield and Mercier. First, the history and
tradition of the monument with its dual religious and secular purposes should
be an important factor for allowing the cross to stay in its present location.296
Imagine Greece tearing down the Parthenon or the United Kingdom destroying
Stonehenge because of the monument's religious nature-such actions would
be unthinkable. Second, the government can overcome the objections to
whether or not real separation can be achieved. The reversionary interest in the
property does not force the VFW to maintain a Latin cross on the property
forever,297 and the government's strenuous efforts to achieve the land transfer
295. See MARGARET BAYARD SMITH, THE FIRST FORTY YEARS OF WASHINGTON SOCIETY,
PORTRAYED BY THE FAMILY LETTERS OF MRS. SAMUEL HARRISON SMITH (MARGARET BAYARD)
FROM THE COLLECTION OF HER GRANDSON, J. HENLEY SMITH 13 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1906)
(commenting on President Thomas Jefferson's regular attendance at the church services held
each Sunday in the United States Capitol Building).
296. See Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 702 (2005) (Breyer, J., concurring) (weighing
the history and tradition against a formulaic test and determining that the history and tradition of
the monument is far more instructive).
297. See 16 U.S.C. § 41 Oaaa-56 (2000 & Supp. 2007) (requiring that the land be used as a
World War I memorial).
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worked a secular purpose in attempting to escape an Establishment Clause
violation.298 Further, the cross in Buono, like the Ten Commandments monument
in Van Orden, can escape its past.2 9 9 The initial cross was constructed seven
decades prior to any challenges, and during that time the cross picked up a dual
secular meaning for observers as a World War I memorial. 00 As to the final
objection of the appearance, courts have recognized that the appearance of the cross
itself can serve a secular purpose. 301 Third, public function, raised by the defendants
in Marshfield, Mercier, and Buono is dissimilar to what is going on in the land
transfer cases because there is no elaborate sham by the govemment. °2 The White
Cross Memorial land is actually being turned over to the private party, and the
government is not secretly running the land behind the scenes.30 3 Fourth, the
government should not suppress religious speech on private property. Given the
option to tear down a monument or to erect a barrier, the latter should be chosen
every time.304  The ACLU, given its asserted mission of protecting all First
Amendment rights, should not be advocating for such a result.305 The consequences
of such a precedent could be drastic. Finally, the Ninth Circuit is in direct
opposition to not only another circuit, but the branches popularly elected by the
298. See Paulson v. City of San Diego, 294 F.3d 1124, 1132 (9th Cir. 2002) (en banc)
(stating that San Diego's efforts to sell a forty-five-foot-high cross war memorial served a
secular purpose); see also Nat'l Archives & Records Admin. v. Favish, 541 U.S. 157, 174
(2004) (acknowledging that Congress, like the Court, has sworn to uphold the Constitution and
that presumption will not be overcome without clear evidence to the contrary).
299. See Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 703 (Breyer, J., concurring) (stating the short and stormy
nature of the Kentucky postings compared to the long, historical tradition of the Texas
monument).
300. See Nystrom, supra note 142 (describing the dual meaning that the cross represents to
the local residents).
301. See supra note 222 and accompanying text (providing three specific examples of other
courts finding a Latin cross to have a secular meaning).
302. See Freedom from Religion Found., Inc. v. City of Marshfield, 203 F.3d 487,492 (7th
Cir. 2000) (contrasting the facts of the case with Evans, where the government set up a straw
purchaser and continued to act as if nothing had changed).
303. Cf Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 842 n.7 (1982) (distinguishing Evans as a
case where the government really provided all of the public services and disguised itself in the
acts of private individuals).
304. See Marshfield, 203 F.3d at 497 (observing the two options presented to the
government and stating that "[t]he latter-not the former-is the appropriate solution").
305. See Am. Civil Liberties Union: About Us, http://www.aclu.org/about/index.html (last
visited on Jan. 20, 2008) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review) ("The mission of
the ACLU is to preserve all of these protections and guarantees: Your First Amendment
Rights-freedom of speech, association and assembly; freedom of the press, and freedom of
religion.... ").
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people.3°6 While the will of the people should not dictate what the Constitution
means, it can be persuasive.0 7
The Seventh Circuit's strong, functioning line ofjurisprudence is ready for an
adaptation by the Supreme Court. In addition to the three examples of "unusual
circumstances" laid out by the Seventh Circuit, this Note proposes that two
additional prongs, derived from First Amendment jurisprudence, should be added
by the Court. First, sham transactions using a straw purchaser are not to be
permitted. A reviewing court should look to the substance of the transaction as well
as its form to find out if the government "has actually disentangled itself' from
improper endorsement.3 8 Only if a court finds "continuing and excessive
involvement between the government and private citizens" should the court consider
the land transaction invalid.30 9 Second, a sale must comply with state law for the
sale of government land.3 0 Third, the government must not sell the property
significantly below fair market value as that would imply that the land is a gift to the
religious organization. 311 Fourth, the reviewing court must examine the stated intent
of the government actors and not a potential motive. Finally, the speech
implications must weigh into the decision of the court. The adoption of this five-
part test would present a livable compromise to end a bitter fight. On one hand, a
symbol which is despised by a group may be shielded from public view. On the
other hand, the monument that not only represents a period of American history, but
also means a great deal to the local community and America's servicemen and
women who have fought and given their lives to make this lawsuit possible, can
continue to stand as it has for the last seventy years. As the Seventh Circuit wisely
stated in 2000, selling the land and building a fence around monuments does not
make either party happy, but it does provide a constitutional solution.312
306. See Buono v. Kempthome, 502 F.3d 1069, 1082 (9th Cir. 2007), amended and
superseded and reh'g denied by Buono v. Kempthome, 527 F.3d 758 (9th Cir. 2008)
(discussing congressional action aimed at transferring the land).
307. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643,653-54 (1961) (holding that the exclusionary rule is
applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment partly because of the rule's growing
acceptance by the states); see also United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 423 (1976)
(considering the judgment of Congress in determining whether an arrest was reasonable).
308. See Freedom from Religion Found., Inc. v. City ofMarshfield, 203 F.3d 487,492 (7th
Cir. 2000) (addressing these typical improprieties to determine whether an "unusual
circumstance" is present that would make the land transfer inappropriate).
309. See id. (discussing when a land arrangement does not pass constitutional muster).
310. See id. (finding that these private groups must comply with state property laws to
avoid a sham transaction).
311. See id. (comparing when a land transfer is a purchase as opposed to a gift from the
government to the religious group).
312. See Mercier v. Fraternal Order of Eagles, 395 F.3d 693, 705 (7th Cir. 2005)
(predicting the reaction to the court's decision).
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